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2Abstract
Outcome interdependence predisposes firms to simultaneously cooperate and compete.
Hence, it may shape the social structure of rival y. Outcome interdependence may stem
from similarities in (a) types of suppliers/buyers, (b) resources, (c) geographic
catchment areas, and (d) strategic beliefs of managers.  A QAP canonical correlation
analysis links multidimensional indicators of interdependence to multiplex ties between
organizations.  A study of banks in Illinois revealed that geographic proximity is the
most important factor driving competition and cooperative alliances. However, certain
alliances (e.g., correspondent banking) allow banks to transcend the constraints of this
geographic fragmentation.  Implications for the relevance of social capital and
structural holes are discussed.
3When managers contemplate strategic actions, they need to know (a) which firms are
likely to respond and (b) what form that response will take.  These practical concerns
of managers also reflect two basic research questions addressing the emerge t social
structure of rivalry within an industry.  This paper explores a variety of factors that
might shape the interactions among rival firms within an industry.  
One of the essential tasks for managers is to find a niche in a value chain
(presumably) between a set of suppliers and a set of buyers that allows the firm to
survive and perhaps even prosper.  Thus, vertical relationships (transactions) in the
value chain are assumed to be the primary focus of the firm.  However, horizontally
related firms (those in the sam  niche) may influence each other*s perfo mance as they
vie for transactions with suppliers and/or buyers.  In other words, firms within a niche
may experience outcome interdependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 40) so eloquently put it, “Interdependence is the
reason why nothing comes out quite the way one wants it to.” If the actions of a focal
firm alter the performance of other firms, then the focal firm creates (through its own
actions) the incentives for the other firms to engage it and attempt to influence its
behavior.  Consequently, strategists often search for ways to avoid and/or eliminate
horizontally related firms, thereby freeing the focal firm from the entanglements of
outcome interdependence.  In the terminology of Burt (1992), firms (actors) should
avoid being pitted against a rival by a tertiusgaudens (a third party who profits from
competition among the two rivals).  Actors should strive for autonomy by seeking
structural holes that enable them to adopt the (profitable) role of the te tius.  This
essentially recommends establishing a (local) monopoly.  
While many managers may yearn for this sort of monopoly position, this may not
be a realistic option for most firm .  As Walker, Kogut, and Shan (1997) point out, “It
is exactly the structural constraints on what people know and can control ... that
presents the opportunities for brokers” (p.  110).  Further, they state that “if structure
did not persist, all firms would be potential brokers but with few enduring
opportunities” (p.  122).  
4If a firm can not escape the ntanglements of interdependence, the most viable
alternative might be to directly interact with horizontally related firms in an attempt to
manage that interdependence.  Indeed, interdependence is the essence of oligopoly
(Porter, 1980).  “By considering power in the context of interdependence, we admit ...
the possibility that increasing interdependence may result in increased net power.  It is
this possibility on which coalitions rest” (Thompson, 1967: 32).  Dense ties within a set
of firms facilitate the flow of information among those firms and make it possible to
coordinate sanctions for deviant behavior. Thus, dense (redundant) ties within a set of
firms generate social captial.  “Firms draw upon network structure as a system-level
resource to facilitate the governance of their relationships” (Walker et al., 1997: 110).
Rather than avoiding contact, conflicting parties often move towards each other and
employ a policy of constructive engagement.
Regrettably, competition is often viewed as the opposite of cooperation.  Zagare
(1984) notes that conflicts are hardly ever analogous to a zero-sum game.  Most social,
political or economic interactions are characterized by a mixture of competitive and
complementary interests among the actors.  For clarity, the term rivalry is used to
describe interactions among interdependent actors.  Rivalry stems from rivalis which
refers to using the same stream as another (Sykes, 1976).  The stream, in this context,
is the flow of resources from the tributaries of raw materials to the sea of
end-consumers.  It is in this stream that business rivalries are spawned. 
Rivals may decide to interact directly with each other in an attempt to increase
their mean performance.  Cut-throat competition among rivals reduces profits for all
the rivals, while cooperation (collusion) would allow the rivals to take greater profits
with monopoly rents as an upper bound (Scherer, 1980).  Further, they may seek to
decrease the uncertainty stemming from the interdependence (Bresser & Harl, 1986;
Gerlach, 1992; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Walker et al. (1997) note that cooperative
alliances may generate social cap tal that facilitates the monitoring and enforcement of
cooperative agreements.  By supplementing and/or complementing each other*s asse s,
a collective may compete in ways that none of its member firms could (Penrose, 1959).
5This may even include attempts to manipulate (enact) industry structure.  Thus,
enlightened self-interest is expected to stimulate cooperation as well as competition.
Hypothesis 1.  Interdependent firms simultaneously cooperate and compete with each
other.
While cooperative alliances may create a wealth of opportunities, there are
generally costs associated wi h maintaining the alliance (Lanning, 1987; Walker et al.,
1997).  These include the cost of carrying free riders, monitoring to ensure mutual
compliance, and administering penalties to maverick firms.  The members of a
cooperative alliance will be willing to absorb the various costs as long as they do not
exceed the marginal gains obtained through cooperation (collusion).  Thus, ther1
appear to be economic factors limiting the viability of alliances.  
Dollinger (1990) notes that structural factors (e.g., geographic fragmentation)
also limit the scope and sustainability of alliances.  One could argue that a recipe (Huff,
1982) for cooperation could diffuse from one firm to another until it spreads throughout
the entire network (the industry).  However, structural holes may prevent collective
strategies from diffusing throughout the industry (Burt, 1992).  
In a closed [fully connected] network, firms as institutional actors have
access to social capital, a resource that helps the development of norms
for acceptable behavior and the diffusion of information about behavior.
...  Firms in open [sparse] networks have no social capital on which to
rely.  If firms are not connected to each other extensively, norms regarding
cooperation are more difficult to achieve, and information on behavior in
relationships diffuses more slowly.  (Walker et al., 1997: 111)
Thus, it is unlikely that firms within a fragmented industry could collectively
decide upon a coordinated response.  Howevr, they might independently adopt parallel
responses to one or more common (isomorphic) environmental fo ces (Dollinger, 1990).
This study explores contingencies that might affect collective behavior.  Specifically,
factors contributing o outcome interdependence may predispose firms to interact with
6each other (presumably, to manage that interdependence).  Different sources of
interdependence may also trigger different types of interactions.  
Sources of Interdependence
It may be difficult to assess the degree to which firms actually influence each other*s
performance.  If firms both help and hinder each other*s perfo mance, then the ne
impact of that influence may be negligible despite intense interactions.  Further, if
managers within a firm recognize the contingent strategies employed by other firms,
they may subsequently avoid strategic actions that would provoke costly retaliations
from those other firms (Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Chen and Miller, 1994).  Hence,
relationships among firms may be affected more by the potential to influence
performance rather than the degree of influence actually exerted.  With that in mind,
four factors are considered that contribute to outcome interdependence.
Interdependence among firms may stem from their similarity with respect to
(a) suppliers and/or buyers, (b) resources, (c) geographic locations, and (d) strategic
beliefs.  
Similarity of Suppliers and/or Buyers
White (1981: 543-544) suggets that “Pressure from the buyer side creates a mirror in
which producers see themselves, not consumers.”  In other words, it is the process of
vying for customers that makes rivals aware of each other.  As noted above, buyers (as
tertius gaudens) have an incentive not only to make the rivals aware of each other, but
also to fuel the flames of competition that may be burning between those rivals (Burt,
1992).  Rivals may decrease each other*s market power by providing options in the
market place.  However, rivals do not always have a negative impact on performance
and uncertainty.  “There is a presumption of tension here.  Control merges from tertius
brokering tension between other players.  No tension, no tertius” (Burt, 1992: 32).
Rivals may cooperate (collude), thereby creating in effect a problem of small numbers
for the suppliers and/or buyers (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Williamson, 1975).  Thus,
structural equivalence regarding transaction partners induces outcome interdependence
7and thereby stimulates interactions among rivals (Burt, 1988; Burt, 1992; Burt and
Carlton, 1989; White, 1992).
Hypothesis 2.  The degree of similarity with respect to suppliers and/or buyers is
positively related to the intensity of rivalry between firms.  
Similarity of Resources
Firms seek the most profitable niches (defined in terms of resource configurations) that
they can successfully defend.  Managers of firms observe other firms to assess the
relative profitability of various combinations of resources (Huff, 1982; Porac, Thomas,
and Baden-Fuller, 1989).  If a rival firm develops a profitable resource configuration,
some of its competitors may be tempted to imitate it (Aldrich, McKelvey, and Ulrich,
1984).  As a result, firms tend to converge on the configuration of resources that yield
the highest levels of performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tang and Thomas,
1992).  This is the basic logic behind the concept of strategic groups (Tang and
Thomas, 1992; McGee and Thomas, 1986; Newman, 1978; Hatten and Schendel,
1977; Cool and Schendel, 1988).  
Mobility barriers lower the economic incentives for potential entrants and help
to preserve economic incentives for incumbents (Carroll, Pandian, and Thomas, 1993;
Caves and Porter, 1977; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1987; Hatten and Hatten, 1987;
Mascarenhas and Aaker, 1989).  Firms within a group may cooperate with each other
to maintain their protective barriers.  However, such bar iers may also focus the impact
of competitive actions on the firms within that group.  Thus, firms with similar resource
configurations tend to be interdependent and are therefore predisposed to interact.  
Hypothesis 3.  The degree of similarity with respect to resources is positively related
to the intensity of rivalry between firms.
Geographic Proximity
8Outcome interdependence may also be inferred from issues related to geographic spatial
competition.  Typically, spatial competition research follows from Hotelling*s (1929)
approach in which a set of interdependent, interacting firms is given, and the task is to
infer where those firms would (should) position themselves (Carroll, Pandian, and
Thomas, 1993; Scherer, 1980).  However, in this study, t e problem is reversed.  Given
that firms have already picked their locations, we need to determine which firms ar
capable of influencing each other*s performance and hence are predisposed to interact
with each other.  
Firms conduct transactions with buyers as well as suppliers from a finite
geographic area (a c tchment area).  Firms with overlapping catchment areas vie for
suppliers and/or buyers and thereby influence each other*s performance.  This outcome
interdependence may predispose the two firms to engage each other as rivals.
Conversely, if the catchment areas of the firms do not overlap, there should be no
outcome interdependence and, hence, no rivalry.  
This reflects an incremental increase in outcome interdependence due to the
proportion of overlap in geographic catchment areas.  Additionally, there may be a
quantum effect of geographic overlap on interdependence.  For instance, firms may
engage in “border skirmishes” in which each firm ttempts to extend its catchment area
by cutting into the catchment area of neighboring firms.  The performance of a firm
may be hurt if a neighbor draws away some of the firm*s suppliers and buyers.  On the
other hand, there are costs of attracting new partners from those border regions.  The
administrative costs of continuously negotiating new contracts to lure customers back
and forth may dampen the performance of firms on both sides of the border
(Williamson, 1975).  As ongoing skirmishes push the boundaries back nd forth, the
firms may find that they are highly interdependent even though the degree of ov rlap
observed at any point in time is (deceptively) small.
In this study, a model is proposed which combines the incremental and quantum
effects of geographic overlap on interdependence among firms.  Further, since many
banks and bank holding companies have more than ne location, the proposed model
also addresses multi-point spatial competition.  
9Hypothesis 4.  The degree of overlap in geographic catchment areas is positively
related to the intensity of rivalry between firms.
Similarity of Strategic Beliefs
A fourth source of outcome interdependence between firms may stem from the strategic
beliefs held by the managers in those firms.  For instance, managers may differ with
respect to goals.  Some goals (e.g., market share) frame rivalry as a zero-sum game,
while other goals (e.g., ROI) frame it as a mixed-motive game (Porter, 1980).  Hence,
different goals may suggest different patterns of interdependence and different styles
of interactions.
A knowledge of goals will allow predictions about whether or not each
competitor is satisfied with its present position and financial results, and
thereby, how likely that competitor is to change strategy and the vigor
with which it will react to outside events (for instance, the business cycle)
or to moves by other firms.  (Porter, 1980: 50)
Managers in the same niche are likely to hold similar beliefs regarding the most
efficient and effective means of obtaining each goal. The similarities may develop
independently through parallel experiences in handling similar resources.  Managers
may also learn vicariously by watching each other (Huff, 1982; Porac and Thomas,
1990; White, 1981).  Further, ideas may diffuse through a niche via communication
with the same suppliers and buyers (Burt, 1987; Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991) and via
direct communication involving interlocking directorates, social interactions
(e.g., country club memberships), and family ties (Gerlach, 1992).  Notably, geographic
proximity would facilitate these communication processes.  Hence, the factors driving
interdependence among firms (similar resources, similar supp ier/buyer transactions,
geographic proximity) may also predispose managers to holding similar beliefs.  It
follows that the degree of similarity in beliefs between managers may covary with the
degree of interdependence between their firms.  
Further, a causal relationship may also exist.  Managers with similar beliefs
would presumably direct their respective firms to acquire similar configurations of
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resources and seek similar patterns of transactins with suppliers and/or buyers (Porac,
Thomas, and Baden-Fuller, 1989).  Thus, managers holding similar beliefs may steer
their firms along strategic rajectories towards a common niche, thereby increasing the
degree of interdependence between their firms.  
Hypothesi 5.  The degree of similarity in the strategic beliefs of managers is
positively related to the intensity of rivalry between the respective firms.  
Links Among the Sources of Interdependence
Hypotheses 2 through 5 reflect complementary views of interdependence among rivals.
This interdisciplinary research is based on the assumption that combining these views
will generate richer insight  than applying each view independently.  For instance, it is
possible for two firms to target th  same suppliers or buyers using different resource
configurations.  Similarly, two firms may target different markets despite similarities
in their resources.  Ceteris paribus, dyads with similar resources and transaction
partners will experience more outcome interdependence than dyads with marked
differences on one or both of those measures.  
Still, there may be circumstances in which similarities in both resources and
types of transaction partners are vitu lly irrelevant in determining the interdependence
and rivalry between two firms.  Consider rivalry within geographically fragmented
industries.  For instance, two small community banks located at opposite ends of a large
state probably would not view each other as rivals even if they had identical
configurations of resources and targeted the same types of customers.  So, overlapping
catchment areas may be a necessary condition (an enabling factor) for outcome
interdependence (Hypothesis 4).  However, geographic proximity may not be 
sufficient condition for interdependence.  Consider a small community bank that
focuses on low- to moderate-income individuals and an enormous money center bank
that focuses on large corporate customers.  These two banks would not be expected to
influence ach other*s performance even if they are located right next door to each
other.  The small community bank would not have the resources to meet the demands
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of the large bank*s corporate customers (Elliott, 1992; Standard and Poor*s, 1987).
Similarly, the money-center bank may be inefficient and ineffective at serving the small
bank*s individual customers (Freer, 1992; Rubenstein, 1992).  
Presumably, outcome interdependence provides the incentives for
interorganizational interactions.  However, in many cases the incentives are ambiguous
(e.g., in turbulent industries) or conflicting (e.g., in oligopolies).  In such cases, it may
be necessary to turn to the cognitive processes of the managers to discover the factors
guiding the firm (March and Simon, 1958).  Hence, all four of the sources of
interdependence should be considered simultaneously to infer patterns of rivalry among
firms (see Hypotheses 2 through 5).
The Illinois Banking Industry
These hypotheses are empirically tested in a study of rivalry among Illinois banks.  The
rise in interstate banking has increased levels of competition among domestic banks
(Danielson, 1992).  There has been a widespread fear that huge banks and holding
companies that are emerging in the frenzy for consolidation will inevitably crush the
smaller community banks (Nadler, 1992a; Rubenstein, 1992).  However, community
banks seem to be able to compete effectively (Rhoades and Savage, 1991).  
While the competition may be heating up among banks, there are also incentives
for banks to cooperate with each other via loan participations (Leon, 1992; Nowak,
1991), outsourcing (Crone, 1992; Leonard, 1992; McHenry, 1992), joint-ventures, and
other consortia (Arend, 1992).  Deregulation has resulted in an increased competition
from other types of financial institutions (Nadler, 1992b; Pace, 1989).  This has
triggered still more calls for cooperation among banks.  For instance, Nadler (1992b)
argues that banks should not be fighting amongst themselves; rather, they should form
a united front (with a common lobbying agenda) to protect the traditional banking
markets from the incursions of non-bank entrants.  
The banking industry is geographically fragmented; customers are unwilling to
absorb the costs and i convenience of traveling to distant banking locations.  Indeed,
geographic location may be the primary determinant of retail success in banking
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(Carroll, 1992; Deutsch, [April]  1992b).  Individual consumers generally have most
of their accounts in banking sites located within 1-2 miles from their home (Britt,
1992).  Small and mid-sized businesses predominantly use banks located within 30
miles of their business location (Melia, 1992).  Automatic teller machines (ATMs),
video-conferencing sites and branch-sites in supermarkets ar  also springing up in many
areas as banks try to reach out to more customers (Britt, 1992; Matlow, 1992).  
Federal and state regulations make the Illinois banking industry an attractive
setting for research.  Banks are limited in the scope of activities that they may pursue
(thus defining a meaningful niche) within the broader financial services industry.  It is
also helpful to constrain the study to the boundaries of a single state to control for the
impact of regulatory policies that vary across states.  Regulatory policies also require
all banks to file quarterly reports.  Thus, detailed financial and accounting data are
available for every member of the population.
In this geographically fragmented industry, it is conceivable that collective
strategies could not diffuse through the industry.  However, consistent patterns of
alliances may emerge if banks independently adopt parallel responses to commo
environmental forces (Dollinger, 1990).  Factors contributing to outcome
interdependenc are used to explain simultaneous competition and cooperation among
banks as well as the specific types of alliances that emerge within the industry.  
METHODS
Sample 
The population of interest is the (domestic) Illinois banking industry (i.e., banks
required to file FFIEC 031, 032, 033, or 04 report forms).  In total, 1,026 banks were
identified from the FDIC call report data from the fourth quarter of 1992.  Surveys
were sent to all of these banks.  A total of 317 banks (31% of the total population)
provided usable data (see Table 1).  The overwhelming majority (79%) of the





The total assets held by institutions are considered along with the quality of the
financial assets.  Measures are derived from each bank*s balance sheet, income sheet,
and supplemental forms (FDIC call report forms, fourth quarter, 1992) follow
suggestions from Sheshunoff*s (1991) and Standard & Poor*s (1987).  To correct for
skewness in the distributions of this bank-level data, the natural logarithm was
computed for each item (e.g., total assets).  
The method for combining data from the diverse perspectives in this study is to
express all the data at a common level of analysis: a dy dic relationship between banks.
Hence, for every possible pair of banks, two Euclidean distance measures were
calculated: (a) general assets and (b) asset quality.  To reduce the computational
demands stemming from the size of the networks, the analyses were performed using
only the lower triangles of these two Euclidean distance matrices.
(Dis)similarity in Product Markets
Most customers are simultaneously buyers and suppliers of f nds (a fungible resource).
Banks are required to maintain a certain level of confidentiality for their customers.
Hence, it is not possible to assess the structural or role equivalence of banks based on
their relationships with specific customers.  The emphasis placed on product-markets
is used in lieu of transactions with  specific bank customers.  This is similar to the
approach used by Burt (1988).  
Measures are derived from the assets and liabilities as well as income and
expenses (FDIC call report forms, fourth quarter, 1992) follow suggestions from
Sheshunoff*s (1991) and Standard & Poor*s (1987).  The general mix of product-
markets is reflected in one set of ratios.  Three additional sets of r tios provide more
fine-grained information on deposits, loans, and securities.  Note that the items are
expressed as percentages rather than in dollar values.  Hence, the product-market
variables should be orthogonal to the resourc  variables.  Metaphorically, the resource2
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variables reflect the size of the pie, and the market variables reflect how the pie is sliced
(regardless of its overall size).  
This data must be expressed at the desired level of analysis: the dyadic
relationship between banks.  A Euclidean distance ma rix was generated for each of the
four categories, and the lower triangle of each matrix was used in the analyses.  
Overlap in Geographic Catchment Areas
Interdependence stems from the intersection of the catchment areas of firms.  For
simplicity, let us assume that a firm ttracts customers from an equal distance in every
direction.  The catchment area for each site is then represented by the area of a circle,
and the firm is positioned in the center.  Further, let us assume that the customers are
uniformly distributed within each catchment area.  Let  nd r  be the radii of thea b
circular catchment areas for Firm-A and Firm-B, respectively.  To facilitate discussion,
the firm with the largest catchment area will be labeled Firm-A (0 <  # r ).  Let db a
represent the distance between the two firms (the foci of the circles).  Given r , r , anda b
d, find the proportion of the smaller circle that is covered by the larger one.  
The radius of the catchment area for each firm (r  and r ) was assessed with thea b
following questionnaire item: "Most (90%) of our customers are within _____ miles of
one of  our banking locations."  To find the distance (d) between all possible pairs of3
banking locations, the addresses of each bank*s headquarters and branch locations were
obtained from The 1993 Illinois Financial Directory (Continental Bank, 1993).  These
addresses were then matched as closely as possible to the latitudes and longitude
obtained from The US Geological Survey, 1993 [site the dataset] .  The great circle4
method was used to compute the distance between every possible pair of sites:
Distance = cos ( sin(lat)*sin(lat)  +  cos(lat)*cos(lat)*cos(lon - lon) )-1 a b a b a b
where lat  and lat are the latitudes for the two sites and lon lon are thea b a b
corresponding longitudes for those sites.  
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The following equation was used to find the degree of geographic overlap given
the radius of each catchment area and the distance between the banking locations
(Carroll, 1996): 
Area = r (" /180 – sin" cos")  +  r ($ /180 – sin$ cos$),a b
2 2
where " = cos ((r  + d  – r ) / 2r d) and $ = cos((r  + d  – r ) / 2r d).  The–1 2  2 2 –1 2  2 2a b a b a b
proportion of one firm*s catchment area that is covered by a rival firm serves as an
incremental model of the interdependence due to proximity.  This incremental model
generally produces an S-shaped (ogive) curve with a lower bound of zero (no overlap)
and an upper-bound of one (total overlap). 
This incremental model does little to distinguish between (a) pairs of catchment
areas that do not overlap at all and (b) pairs that do intersect each other but only at their
borders.  Since border skirmishes can be quite intense, a quantum effect of geographic
overlap is also proposed (0=no overlap, 1=overlap).  The quantum and incremental
effects are combined to create a measure that equals zero if there is no intersection,
jumps sharply above one if there is some overlap, and eaches its maximum value of
two if the smaller catchment area is completely covered by the larger one.  
Since most banks and bak holding companies have more than one location, the
proposed model is extended to handle multi-point spatial competition.  A site-by-site
matrix is used to reflect the degree of overlap (int rdependence) between every possible
pair of banking sites.  The rows and columns are partitioned such  that the sites
associated with each bank are grouped together.  For a given focal site, the most
relevant site for each rival is found.  This is done by taking the row-wise maximum
within each partition (i.e., within the set of columns associated with each rival bank).
  This reduces the site-by-site matrix to a site-by-bank matrix.  The mean is computed5
for the degree of interdependence between the sites of the focal bank and the most
relevant sites of the rival bank.  This is done by computing the column-wise mean
within each partition (i.e., within each focal bank).  This reduces the site-by-bank
matrix to a bank-by-bank matrix, thereby making it possible to combine this data
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reflecting multi-point geographic spatial competition with data from the other
perspectives.  
The matrix was symmetrized using the maximum of the ij  and the ji  cells, andth th
analyses were then performed using only the lower triangle of the matrix.  Thus, the
interdependence measure reflects the impact of overlap on the smaller of the two firms
(the firm affected the most by the overlap).  
(Dis)similarity in Anticipated Changes and Evaluations
The data associated with resources, product markets, and geographic catchment areas
provide snapshots of each bank*s position at the time of the study.  To infer where the
banks may be going in the future, a questionnaire was sent to the pr sident of each bank
to assess the changes that were anticipated for the following year.  The following
instructions were used to minimize the respondent*s urge o put a positive spin on
anticipated changes.  
(a) Uncontrollable factors may prevent your bank from achieving some of its goals.
For each goal and tactic listed below, indicate the change you anticipate for your
bank next year.
(b) Considering the impact of uncontrollable factors, anticipated changes are not
always positive.  Would it be good or bad for your bank if the anticipated
changes occurred?
Anticipated changes were scaled from -3 (an extreme decrease) to +3 (an extreme
increase) with the midpoint  of 0 (no anticipated change).  Evaluations of those changes
were scaled from -3 (extremely bad) to +3 (extremely good) with the  midpoint  of 0
(neutral).  Missing values and items that were marked as not applicable were assigned
a value of 0.  
To distinguish intentional (desired) changes from unintentional (undesired)
changes, the respondent*s vector of anticipated changes is cross-multiplied by the vector
of evaluations of those changes.  This approach is loosely based on expectancy-value
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models (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975).  However, the anticipated changes are not
necessarily under the volitional control of members of the organization (taken
individually or collectively).  Thus, the product of the anticipated change times the
evaluation of that change reflects the respondent*s pref rence for change rather than
the intention for change.  
Questionnaire items have been arranged into six groups reflecting different types
of anticipated changes: (a) assets and performance, (b) the mix of product-markets,
(c) geographic positioning (e.g., the numb r, location, and types of sites), (d) corporate
strategies as well as interstate and international expansion, (e) patterns of inter-bank
interactions (e.g., strategic alliances), and (f) different types of strategic investments to
either improve the bank*s fit to the environment (i.e., investing in human resources
versus  investing in technology) or to alter the environment to fit the bank (i.e., lobbying
regulatory agencies).  A Euclidean distance matrix was generated for each of the six
categories, and the lower triangle of each Euclidean distance matrix is used in the
analyses.  
Interorganizational Interactions
Having discussed the sources of interdependence, we turn now to the various forms of
interorganizational interactions.  The degree to which banks cooperate with each other
was assessed in the questionnaire.  Respondents listed up to 12 banks and/or bank
holding companies in Illinois that they cooperate with and/or compete against.  The6
respondents were also asked to indicate the “overall intensity of competition” and the
“overall strength of cooperation” on a scale from 0 (no interaction) to 10 (intense
interaction).  Reported ties are represented in a 317 x 317 matrix for cooperation and
a similar matrix for competition.  
Further, respondents were asked to indicate which forms of cooperation (if any)
existed between the respondent*s bank and each of the rivals l sted.  A 317 x 317 binary
matrix is used for each form of cooperation (1=present, 0=absent).  The following
forms of cooperation were listed in the questionnaire: (a) outsourcing functions to that
bank, (b) selling services to that bank, (c) loan participations, (d) correspondent
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banking, (e) joint ventures, (f) being owned by the same holding company, (g) other
alliances or consortia, and (h) no cooperative relationship.  
 Most of the forms of cooperation (types c - g above) imply that both banks are
involved even if only one of the banks reports the relationship.  To correct for missing7
values, each matrix was symmetrized using the maximum of the ij  and the ji  cells.th th
Outsourcing and selling services reflect complementary, directed ties between banks.
The two associated matrices are combined to form one symmetric matrix reflecting the
existence of a (non-directed) outsourcing arrangement.  The analyses were performed
using only the lower triangle of each symmetrized matrix.  
Analyses
A series of bivariate QAP Pearson correlations are used to link each source of
interdependence with each type of inter-bank interaction.  
The theoretical discussion of interdependence underscores the need to consider
all the sources of interdependence in concert.  Further, rivalry implies that the
interdependent actors simultaneously cooperate and compete.  By allowing the theory
to drive the methods, the central analyses in this study should link the multidimensional
indicators of interdependence to the multiplexrelationships between rival banks.
A traditional canonical correlation analysis (Hotelling, 1935, 1936) is
inappropriate for this study since the unit of analysis is the relationship between two
firms.  “Structural data, such as social network data or spatial data, pose a serious
problem to the social scientist who wishes to te t hyp theses.  This problem stems from
the fact that the observations are not mutually independent” (Krackhardt, 1992: 279).
If violations of assumptions create sufficient doubt regarding the distribution of a
statistic, one practical way forward is to empirically generate a distribution of tha
statistic from the data in question (Mantel, 1967; Edgington, 1969; Hubert and Schultz,
1976; Krackhardt, 1988).  
In this study, QAP is extended to the most general case of the general linear
model: the canonical correlation analysis (a QAP-CCA).  First, a (traditional)8
canonical correlation analysis is run to assess the relationships between the set of
“predictor” matrices and the set of “criterion” matrices.  Probability distributions are 9
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then generated to assess the significance of the obtained statistics.  This is done by
iterating a two-step process.  In the first step, the rows and columns are randomly
permuted (in a synchronous manner to preserve the structure of each network) for
either the  “predictor”  the “criterion” variables.  In the second step, a canonical10
correlation analysis is run on the (partially) rearranged data.  This links the “predictor”
variables for each dyad to the “criterion” variables for a different dyad.  By repeating
the analyses with a large number of permutations (in this case, 99 permutations),
distributions for the statistics are generated reflecting random associations between the
“predictor” and “criterion” variables.  
Tatsuoka (1971: 183) characterized a canonical correlation as a “double-barreled
principal component analysis.”  Canonical correlations are equal to the square roots of
the eigenvalues of the matrix R R R R , where R  and R  are the squareYY YX XX XY XX YY
-1 -1
correlation matrices for the predictor and criterion variables (respectively), and RXY
(= R  ´) is the rectangular correlation matrices linking those two sets of variables.  InYX
a QAP-CCA, statistical significance is inferred by comparing the magnitude of the
original eigenvalues to the eigenvalues obtained from ra dom permutations of that data.
The permutations would not affect R  or R , but it may dramatically alter R .  XX YY XY
RESULTS
The networks reflecting inter-bank interactions are quite sparse (see Table 2).
Krackhardt (1996) performed a Monte Carlo study linking fully connected distanc
matrices (analogous to the Euclidean distance matrices in this study) to sparsely
connected matrices reflecting the most salient tie  (analogous to the rivalry and alliance
matrices).  As the number of actors increases, the maximum possible value of R drops2
at an alarming rate and asymptotically approached zero.  This poses a problem for
surveys of large networks (e.g., industries) when it is not feasible to collect data on all
possible ties.  Even if information was available on all possible ties, this R artifact2
would still persist in a fragmented industry, since by definition, only the nearest
neighbors interact.  Hence, using heuristics such as R (to assess the proportion of2
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variance explained by a model) may drastically underestimate the degree to which the
model fits the data.   
Bivariate Measures of Association
Turning to the measures of interdependence, the QAP Pearson correlations linking the
Euclidean distance matrices for resources, product-markets, and strategic beliefs are
presented in Table 3.  
Hypothesis 1 is supported: the strength of cooperation covaries with the intensity
of competition (see Table 4).  Further, competition is positively correlated with all the
specific forms of cooperative alliances considered in this study.  Interestingly,
competition among banks within the same holding company is relatively weak, but it
does exist.
The bivariate links between interdependence and inter-bank interactions are
presented in Table 5.  The most notable finding is that interdependence due to th
overlap of geographic catchment areas is associated with both cooperation and
competition (Hypothesis 4).  Further, geographic overlap is significantly correlated with
all the cooperative alliances considered in this study.  Thus, neighboring banks tend to
interact more than banks that are geographically far apart.  
QAP-CCA for Rivalry
To link the multidimensional indicators of interdependence to the multiplex ties
between banks, a QAP-CCA is performed.  Standardized canonical coefficients indicate
the weight that each variable was given in the composite.  Since many of these
coefficients appear to be affected by multicolinearity, the canonical structure (i. ., the
correlations betwen each variable and the two composites) may be more informative.
The discussion will focus more on the canonical structure than the canonical
coefficients.  
The First QAP Cano ical Correlation.  The first interdependence composite is
dominated by the degree of overlap in geographic catchment areas, while the composite
for rivalry reflects a mixture of competition and cooperation (see Table 6).  These two
composites are correlated with each other.  Thus, Hypot e is 4 is supported; banks that
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have overlapping geographic catchment areas tend to simultaneously compete and
cooperate with each other.  
The Second QAP Canonical Correlation.  After removing the variance
associated with the first pair of composites, the residuals are used to create a second set
of composites (see Table 7). The high values on the interdependence composite reflect
differences (positive residuals) in general product-markets and in deposits in particular
(a critical source of low-cost funds for banks).  High values of the rivalry composite
reflect positive residuals for cooperation and negative residuals for competition.  In
other words, banks targeting different types of customers (suppliers and buyers of
funds) tend to cooperate more and compete less than would be expected given their
proximity (the variance explained by the first QAP canonical correlation). This
cooperation among banks targeting complementary types of customer contradicts
Hypothesi  2.  However, the opposite end of this linear relationship may be described
by linking low values on both composites.  If two banks target similar types of
customers, they tend to compete more and cooperate less than expected given their
proximity.  This pattern of competition is consistent with Hypothesis 2.
QAP-CCA for Types of Alliances 
The preceding QAP-CCA links interdependence to rivalry (i.e., the degree to which two
banks simultaneously cooperate and compete with each other).  The following
QAP-CCA explores the specific types of cooperative alliances that are forged among
banks.  Four of the six possible canoni al correlations in this analysis were significant.
The First QAP Canonical Correlation.  The first composite for interdependence
is dominated by geographic overlap, but differences in general product-markets and
deposits in particular also contribute to the composite (see Table 8).  Virtually all the
forms of cooperation  contribute to the composite for alliances, although correspondent
banking and loan participations are particularly prominent.  Note that the variance
reflecting membership in the same holding company is suppressed.   Thu , when11
controlling for membership in the same holding company, alliances tend to emerge
22
among neighboring banks targeting complementary types of customers.  This supports
Hypothesis 4.  
The Second QAP Canonical Correlation.  If one only considered the single
strongest linear relationship (as is typical with regression analyses), one might infer that
the industry consisted only of pockets of cooperation involving neighboring firms.
Interestingly, the second QAP canonical correlation identifies long-distance
relationships that may help banks compensate for problems caused by geographic
fragmentation.  This underscores one of the advantages of a multivariate approach to
network analysis.  
After removing the variance associated with the first pair of composites, the
residuals are used to create a second set of composites that are also significantly
correlated with each other (r  = .11, p #  .01).  In this case, high values on thQAP-CC2
interdependence composite are obtained when two banks are geographically far apart
and differ in resources, product-markets in general, and deposits in particular (see
Table 9).  The corresponding composite for cooperative interactions would be large if
two banks engaged in correspondent banking but not in loan participations, join
ventures, or other forms of alliances/consortia.  This is consistent with large money-
center banks acting as clearing-houses for transferring checks over relatively large
distances.  The vast majority of banks in the industry are much smaller and target quite
different product-markets than the large money-center banks.  This pattern of
cooperation between distant banks with complementary resources, complementary
customers is inconsistent with Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4.  
Again, the opposite end of this linear relationship may be described by linking
low values on both composites.  Small values for the interdependence composite would
be associated with banks that are geographically close together and have similar assets
and target similar product markets (especially deposits).  These banks tend to engage
in loan participations, joint ventures, and other alliances/consortia, but they are less
likely to engage in correspondent banking with each other.  That is, when defining a
niche in terms of particular combinations of (a) types of transaction partners,
(b) resource, and (c) geographic location, banks seem to form the types of alliances that
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pool their similar financial and social capital.  This aspect of inter-bank cooperation is
clearly consistent with Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4.
The Third QAP Canonical Correlation.  While the first two canonical
correlations controlled for membership within the same holding company, this third set
of composites explores factors associated with being in the same holding company.  The
composite for interdependence is dominated by negative residuals regarding securities
(i.e., similarities not accounted for by the previous findings).  High values of the
cooperation composite are associated with being in the same holding company,
exchanging services, and engaging in other forms of alliances/consortia (see Table 10).
Variance due to loan participations, correspondent banking, and joint ventures is
suppressed.  Thus, banks within the same holding company that exchange services and
engage in other forms of alliances tend to have similar mixes of securities
(r  = .03, p # .01).  QAP-CC3
The Fourth QAP Canonical Correlation.  The fourth pair of composites also
offers insights into interactions within holding companies. Focusing on low values of
the two composite , if two banks are in the same holding company and engage in loan
participations, they tend to have similar patterns of loans as well as similar patterns of
securities and product-markets in general. 
Regarding rivalry, high values for the interdependence composite occur when two
banks anticipate the same changes in inter-bank interactions have similar deposits
(suppliers of low-cost funds) but otherwise target different types of customers (see
Table 11).  High values for the alliance composite occur when banks from different
holding companies have outsourcing agreements, joint ventures, and other forms of
alliances, but fewer loan participations than expected give previous findings.  Thus,
rival banks that share a common recipe for inter-bank interactions and attract similar
suppliers of funds tend to have outsourcing agreements with each other, form joint
ventures, and share other alliances.  This pattern of cooperation is consistent with
Hypotheses 2 and 5.




The primary goals of this study are to determine who will interact and how.
Presumably, firms that can influence each other*s performance will be motivated to
interact, and that interaction will involve cooperation as well as competition
(Hypotheses 1).  Outcome interdependence may stem from similarities on one or more
of the following factors: types of suppliers and/or buyers (Hypothesis 2), resource
configurations (Hypothesis 3), geographic catchment areas (Hypothesis 4), and
strategic beliefs of managers (Hypothesis 5). 
The findings from this study s pport all five hypotheses.  Among Illinois banks,
inter-bank ties are associated with all four of these sources of interdependence.
However, the most relevant factor appears to be the overlap in catchment areas (see
Tables 5, 6, and 8).  Neighbor banks are more likely than non-neighbors to interact--the
primacy of proximity.  The interactions involve more than just intense competition;
neighbor banks also engage in every form of cooperative alliance considered in this
study.  This provides an initial answer to the question of who will interact and how.
Bankers primarily need to pay attention to the islands of localized rivalry (simultaneous
cooperation and competition among neighboring banks).  
According to one joke, there are three keys to success in banking: location,
location, and location.  Indeed, branch location may be the primary determinant of retail
success in banking (Carroll, 1992; Deutsch, 1992a).  Ironically, banks are not always
systematic in their approach to establishing banking locations, and this has hurt profits
(Carroll, 1992).  Bankers would be wise to closely monitor the locations of rivals and
employ one or more of the available software packages linking the geographic and
demographic characteristics of consumers (Deutsch, 1992b; Iacobuzio, 1992).  
If one only looked at the bivariate analyses, one might conclude that bankers
should focus exclusively on their nearest neighbors.  One might infer that the
geographic fragmentation would prevent the development of industry-wide norms for
cooperative alliances (Dollinger, 1990).  However, the multivariate analyses provide
a much richer description of the social structure of rivalry.  Indeed, the QAP-CCA
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provides everal more layers of detail in answering the question of who interacts and
how.  
Often, one of the critical functions in banking (correspondent banking) is
performed most efficiently by seeking out, and establishing relationships with, banks
that are relatively far away (see Table 9).  Metaphorically, bankers are required to shift
their focus from the localized islands of rivalry to the bridges connecting those islands.
Yet another layer of detail can be added.  If bankers agree on how to interact with other
banks and their banks have similar suppliers of funds (deposits), the banks tend to form
alliances involving joint ventures, outsourcing agreements, and participate in other
forms of alliances and consortia (see Table 11).  
This study is, in part, a response to Dollinger*s (1990) call for empirical research
identifying the contingencies that shape the specific forms of cooperative alliances that
emerge within a particular industry.  Walker et al. (1997) suggest that a technologically
driven need for long-term alliances within the biotech industry predisposes biotech
startups to form redundant ties.  The network struc ure creates the social capital needed
to stabilize the relationships among the rivals.  In contrast, the ties with suppliers and
buyers might reflect a greater emphasis on exploiting structural holes if long-term
stability is not essential for the success of those particular ties.  
The findings from this study of Illionois bankers echo the findings of Walker et
al. (1997) insofar as b nks form localized islands of rivalry and develop social capital
by forming a wide range of cooperative alliances.  However, it would be a mistake to
conclude that managing social capital is important and managing structural holes is not.
Correspondent banking demands the efficient use of ties between (rather than within)
the localized cliques of rivals.  Hence, the relevance of social capital and structural
holes appears to vary across functions within the banking industry.  
This underscores one of the benefits of th proposed multivariate approach.  The
QAP-CCA offers a rich view of the social structure of rivalry by revealing layer after
layer of detail.  It explicitly recognizes that (a) contingencies may involve constellations
of environmental factors and (b) managing a mult plexrelationship with one other actor
is fundamentally different from managing each type of relationship separately.
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Arguably, the inherent richness of such social structures demands a multivariate
approach.
While the QAP-CCA was developed to solve a specific problem in this study,
there are countless potential applications.  It is a non-parametric version of the most
general case of the general linear model.  The proposed QAP-CCA may be applied in
traditional multivariate analyses when assumptions regarding a canonical correlation
analysis are violated.  In particular, the structure of network data violates the
assumption of independent observations.  Thus, the QAP-CCA may provide a useful
addition to the wealth of network analysis techniques.  Since the QAP-CCA offers a
quick, comprehensive overview of fact rs shaping the social structure of rivalry in this
industry, it could be used to guide the application of complementary techniques.  For
example, further analyses could identify geographically isolated cliques and assess
reachability based on correspondent banking.  
CONCLUSION
This study examines factors shaping the social structure of rivalry within an industry.
In doing so, insights are drawn from economics, sociology, and psychology to develop
a relatively holistic view of interdependence and rivalry.  The goal here is not to weave
the broad tapestries of these theoretical perspectives together in their entirety.  Far from
it.  This study seeks only to find a single thread of logic that can be seen to run through
each of the broad tapestries.  The Dutch refer to t is as the rode draad (the red thread).
In this particular case, the rode draad is outcome interdependence as a motivation for
interaction.  
It would appear that this approach to interdisciplinary research has been fruitful
in this case.  Tracing the rod  draad through diverse paradigms lead to variations in
the types of research questions typically posed in some of the fields.  The ensuing
theoretical discussions triggered parallel methodological developments--most notably,
a model of multi-point spatial competition and the non-parametric version of a
canonical correlation analysis (QAP-CCA).  The model of spatial competition proved
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to be the best single predictor of interactions among banks.  The QAP-CCA identified
a rich set of contingencies shaping the social structure of rivalry for Illinois banks.  
The contingencies shaping the social structure of rivalry may vary across
industries and even across functions within an industry.  However, the generalizable
implication of these findings for practitioners is that cooperation and competition are
not mutually exclusive.  Indeed, they go hand-in-hand.  Thus it may be inappropriate
to compare the business strategi to a military general.  Strategists may function more
as diplomats who use both cooperative and competitive tactics to achieve their goals
within a broader policy of constructive engagement.  If it is impossible to avoid the
entanglements of interdependence (e.g., by seeking structural holes), try exploiting the
social capital generated by that interdepe d nce.  Metaphorically, if one can not outrun
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 This assumes the degree of risk is also acceptable.  To a risk-averse actor, the1
impact of being exploited in the short-term may be more critical than the
expectation of long-term profitability. 
 In this brief digression, the implicit level of analysis is the firm. 2
 The potential variation in the size of catchment areas from one site to another within3
a given bank has been ignored in this study to simplify the questionnaire and thereby
boost the response rate to the survey.  
 Unfortunately, the latitude and longitude were not obtained for the exact street address4
of each banking location, since interpolating those coordinates for thousands of branch
locations eemed impractical.  Two banks within the same town received the same
coordinates: the latitude and longitude of the town center.  Given that the mean radius
of catchment areas is approximately six miles, it is hoped that the errors in estimating
the locations of the banking sites is relatively small in relation to the size of the
catchment areas.  
 The advantages and disadvantages of other methods of aggregation are discussed by5
Carroll (1996).
 In many respects, holding companies and branching within a bank simply represent6
alternative means of organizing multiple sites (Standard & Poor*s, 1987).  Data
referring to bank holding companies were later disaggr gated to reflect rivalry with (the
member) banks.  
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 Differences in the relative contributions of each actor in these two-way interactions 7
are not addressed in this particular study.  
 I would like to thank David Krackhardt, Tom Snijders, and Roger Leenders for their 8
assistance in developing this technique.
 Terms such as (independent) variables and (dependent) variables are used only for 9
pedagogical purposes. The patterns of association do not indicate causal directionality.
 In this study, there are fewer “criterion” variables than “predictor” variables.  Hence,10
it is more efficient to sort the former than the latter.  However, the decision to permute
one set versus the other is essentially arbitrary.
 Membership in the same holding company serves as a moderating variable since the11
sign of the standardized coefficient is opposite that of the correlation between the
variable and the composite.
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Table 1. The Number of Each Type of Domestic Banks in Illi ois and the Response
Rate Obtained for the Questionnaire.
FFIEC Total in Response
Type of Bank Form Illinois Frequency Rate
                                                                                 
  Domestic with Foreign Offices31 8 5 63 %
  Assets $300M 32 74 22 30 %
  Assets $100M&<$300M 33 213 71 33 %
  Assets<$100M 34 731 219 30 %
  Total 1026 317 31%
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Table 2.Means and Standard Deviations for the Measures of Interdependence and




General Assets 1.95 1.48






Anticipated & Preferred Changes
Assets & Performance 5.27 2.06
Focus of Strategic Investments 2.99 1.75
Product-Markets 7.20 2.87
Inter-Bank Interactions 4.39 2.16
Banking Locations 3.46 2.00
Corporate & International Strategy 5.18 2.28
Geographic Overlap
Quantum & Incremental .05 .28
Rivalry
Strength of Cooperation .06 .68
Intensity of Competition .10 .88
Types of Alliances
Outsource-Provide Services .00 .04
Loan Participations .00 .06
Correspondent Banking .01 .07
Joint Ventures .00 .02
In Same Holding Company .00 .03
Other Alliances-Consortia .00 .04
                                                                       
Table 3. QAP Pearson Correlations Between the Indicators of Outcome Interdependence (n=50,086 dyads).
Resources
(1) General Assets 1.00
(2) Asset Quality  .12 1.00
Product-Markets
(3) General  .38* . 1.00
(4) Deposits  .22* . .38*1.00
(5) Loans .14* .11 .19* .15*1.00
(6) Securities .12* .14* . .13* . 1.00
Anticipated & Preferred Changes
(7) Assets & Performance . . . .10 . . 1.00
(8) Strategic Investments -.07 . . . . . .43*1.00
(9) Product-Markets . . . . . . .66* .53*1.00
(10) Inter-Bank Interactions  . . .16* .20* . . .31* .27* .41*1.00
(11) Banking Locations .15* . .09 . .16* .09 .25* .25* .35* .27*1.00
(12) Corp & Int’l Strategy .12* . .23* .10 . . .23* .16* .33* .32* .33*1.00
Geographic Overlap
(13) Quantum & Incremental . . .14* .13* . . . . . .11* . . 1.00
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Note: The correlations that are shown are significant at p#.05 unless otherwise noted.
*  p#.01     
Table 4. QAP Pearson Correlations Between the Inter-Bank Interactions (n=50,086 dyads).
Rivalry
(1) Overall Competition 1.00
(2) Overall Cooperation .39 1.00
Types of Alliances
(3) Outsource-Provide Services.16 .39 1.00
(4) Loan Participations .23 .63 .27 1.00
(5) Correspondent Banking .23 .63 .44 .32 1.00
(6) Joint Ventures .10 .25 .08 .19 .09 1.00
(7) Same Holding Company .03 .35 .21 .33 .09 .24 1.00
(8) Other Alliances-Consortia .21 .33 .11 .12 .13 .18 .05 1.00
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Note: All QAP Pearson correlations shown here are significant at p # .01.
Table 5.  QAP Pearson Correlation Linking Interdependence Indicators to the Types of Alliances (n=50,086 dyads).
Rivalry Types of Cooperative Alliances
Intensity Strength Outsource- Other
of Overall of Overall Provide Loan CorrespondentJoint In Same Alliances & 
Interdependence CompetitionCooperation ServicesParticipationBanking Venture BHC Consortia
Resources
General Assets .05 * .03 * .03 . .08 * . . .
Asset Quality . . . . . . . .
Product-Markets
General .07 * .08 * .06 * .02 * .13 * . . .03
Deposits .03 * .07 * .04 * .03 * .11 * . . .
Loans . . . -.01 . . -.01 .
Securities . . . -.01 . . -.03 * .
Anticipated & Preferred Changes
Assets & Performance. . . . . . . .
Strategic Investments-.02 -.02 . . . . . .
Product-Markets . . . . . . . .
Inter-Bank Interactions. .04 * . .03 * .05 * . . .
Banking Locations .03 * . . . . . . .
Corporate & Internat’l. .03 * .03 * . .06 * . . .
Geographic Overlap
Quantum & Incremental.36 * .23 * .09 * .16 * .15 * .07 * .01 .11 *
Note:  The correlations that are shown are significant at least at p#.05.       
*  p#.01     
Table 6.  First QAP Canonical Correlation Linking Interdependence to the Intensity of Rivalry (n=50,086 dyads).
r = .38,  p   .01QAP-CC1 
Indicators of Interdependence Intensity of Rivalry
Standard Correlation with Correlation with Standard
Canonical Composite for: Composite for: Canonical
Coefficient Interdep.Rivalry Interdep.Rivalry Coefficient
Resources 
   General Assets .10 .14 .05 .23 .60 .27 Cooperation
   Asset Quality .04 .06 .02 .37 .97 .86 Competition
Product-Markets
   General Market Mix .05 .21 .08
   Deposits -.04 .13 .05
   Loans -.07 -.02 -.01
   Securities .02 .05 .02
Anticipated & Preferred Changes
   Assets & Performance .02 .01 .00
   Focus of Strategic Investments-.08 -.07 -.03
   Product-Markets .01 -.03 -.01
   Inter-Bank Interactions -.06 .06 .02
   Banking Locations .08 .08 .03
   Corporate & Int’l Strategy .04 .07 .03
Spatial Competition
   Geographic Overlap .98 .98 .37
Table 7.  Second QAP Canonical Correlation Linking Interdependence to the Intensity of Rivalry (n=50,086 dyads).
r = .08,  p   .01QAP-CC2 
Indicators of Interdependence Intensity of Rivalry
Standard Correlation with Correlation with Standard
Canonical Composite for: Composite for: Canonical
Coefficient Interdep.Rivalry Interdep.Rivalry Coefficient
Resources 
   General Assets -.17 -.00 -.00 .06 .80 1.05 Cooperation
   Asset Quality -.19 -.23 -.02 -.02 -.25 -.66 Competition
Product-Markets
   General Market Mix .35 .51 .04
   Deposits .59 .67 .05
   Loans -.22 -.14 -.01
   Securities -.31 -.30 -.02
Anticipated & Preferred Changes
   Assets & Performance .10 .04 .00
   Focus of Strategic Investments.05 -.05 -.00
   Product-Markets -.31 -.09 -.01
   Inter-Bank Interactions .32 .39 .03
   Banking Locations -.25 -.20 -.02
   Corporate & Int’l Strategy .22 .27 .02
Spatial Competition
   Geographic Overlap -.13 .04 .00
Table 8.  First QAP Canonical Correlation Linking Indicators of Interdependence to the Types of Alliances (n=50,086 dyads).
r = .23,  p   .01QAP-CC1 
Indicators of Interdependence Types of Cooperative Alliances
Standard Correlation with Correlation with Standard
Canonical Composite for: Composite for: Canonical
Coefficient Interdep.Rivalry Interdep.Rivalry Coefficient
Resources 
   General Assets .10 .23 .05 .11 .45 .04   Outsource-Provide Services
   Asset Quality -.00 .02 .01 .16 .66 .46   Loan Participations
Product-Markets .19 .83 .63   Correspondent Banking
   General Market Mix .22 .45 .10 .06 .27 .11   Joint Ventures
   Deposits .15 .38 .09 .01 .06 -.20   In Same Holding Company
   Loans -.09 .00 .00 .11 .45 .30   Other Alliances-Consortia
   Securities -.03 .01 .00
Anticipated & Preferred Changes
   Assets & Performance .02 .02 .00
   Focus of Strategic Investments-.04 -.07 -.02
   Product-Markets -.08 -.04 -.01
   Inter-Bank Interactions .06 .21 .05
   Banking Locations .02 .06 .01
   Corporate & Int’l Strategy.11 .19 .05
Spatial Competition
   Geographic Overlap .86 .92 .21
Table 9.  Second QAP Canonical Correlation Linking Interdependence to the Types of Alliances (n=50,086 dyads).
r = .11,  p   .01QAP-CC2 
Indicators of Interdependence Types of Cooperative Alliances
Standard Correlation with Correlation with Standard
Canonical Composite for: Composite for: Canonical
Coefficient Interdep.Rivalry Interdep.Rivalry Coefficient
Resources 
   General Assets .31 .59 .07 .01 .11 -.05   Outsource-Provide Services
   Asset Quality -.03 .05 .01 -.06 -.53 -.77   Loan Participations
Product-Markets .06 .54 .85   Correspondent Banking
   General Market Mix .55 .73 .08 -.04 -.32 -.25   Joint Ventures
   Deposits .30 .52 .06 -.01 -.08 .18   In Same Holding Company
   Loans -.10 .10 .01 -.03 -.27 -.25   Other Alliances-Consortia
   Securities .04 .12 .01
Anticipated & Preferred Changes
   Assets & Performance .03 -.03 -.00
   Focus of Strategic Investments-.02 -.12 -.01
   Product-Markets -.15 -.07 -.01
   Inter-Bank Interactions .02 .11 .01
   Banking Locations .00 .10 .01
   Corporate & Int’l Strategy.17 .30 .03
Spatial Competition
   Geographic Overlap -.52 -.39 -.04
Table 10.  Third QAP Canonical Correlation Linking Interdependence to the Types of Alliances (n=50,086 dyads).
r = .03,  p   .01QAP-CC3 
Indicators of Interdependence Types of Cooperative Alliances
Standard Correlation with Correlation with Standard
Canonical Composite for: Composite for: Canonical
Coefficient Interdep.Rivalry Interdep.Rivalry Coefficient
Resources 
   General Assets -.18 -.12 -.00 .02 .50 .47   Outsource-Provide Services
   Asset Quality .12 -.03 -.00 .00 .01 -.35   Loan Participations
Product-Markets .00 .01 -.19   Correspondent Banking
   General Market Mix .27 .15 .00 .00 .15 -.07   Joint Ventures
   Deposits -.32 -.35 -.01 .03 .80 .83   In Same Holding Company
   Loans -.08 -.07 -.00 .01 .35 .33   Other Alliances-Consortia
   Securities -.68 -.70 -.02
Anticipated & Preferred Changes
   Assets & Performance -.08 -.13 -.00
   Focus of Strategic Investments-.28 -.20 -.01
   Product-Markets .09 -.00 -.00
   Inter-Bank Interactions -.32 -.22 -.01
   Banking Locations .17 .10 .00
   Corporate & Int’l Strategy.49 .39 .01
Spatial Competition
   Geographic Overlap -.00 -.04 -.00
Table 11.  Fourth QAP Canonical Correlation Linking Interdependence to the Types of Alliances (n=50,086 dyads).
r = .03,  p   .01QAP-CC4 
Indicators of Interdependence Types of Cooperative Alliances
Standard Correlation with Correlation with Standard
Canonical Composite for: Composite for: Canonical
Coefficient Interdep.Rivalry Interdep.Rivalry Coefficient
Resources 
   General Assets -.10 .07 .00 .01 .32 .61   Outsource-Provide Services
   Asset Quality .11 .21 .01 -.01 -.45 -.47   Loan Participations
Product-Markets -.00 -.09 -.25   Correspondent Banking
   General Market Mix .59 .34 .01 .01 .27 .41   Joint Ventures
   Deposits -.67 -.41 -.01 -.01 -.53 -.60   In Same Holding Company
   Loans .46 .45 .01 .01 .39 .36   Other Alliances-Consortia
   Securities .46 .38 .01
Anticipated & Preferred Changes
   Assets & Performance -.12 -.12 -.00
   Focus of Strategic Investments.10 .02 .00
   Product-Markets .21 -.02 -.00
   Inter-Bank Interactions -.30 -.31 -.01
   Banking Locations -.19 -.08 -.00
   Corporate & Int’l Strategy-.04 -.05 -.00
Spatial Competition
   Geographic Overlap .11 .07 .00
